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Abstract 
In this paper I combine a theoretically developed construction of the school to work transition litera-
ture, namely the stratification and standardization dimensions of the education system, and the more 
data oriented inequality of opportunity research of the economics of education. I collect several possi-
ble indicators for both dimensions to compare the countries: utilizing the PISA 2003 data and some 
other OECD sources I run multilevel analysis to test the effect of the collected country level stratifica-
tion and standardization indicators on the inequality and on the effectiveness of education. Inequality 
of opportunity is indicated by the size of the parental background effect on the PISA literacy scores, 
while effectiveness is the literacy score adjusted for parental background and other individual charac-
teristics. The results show that stratification associates strongly and positively with the inequality of 
educational opportunity, while standardization in general seems to enhance equality. I reject that 
stratification would increase effectiveness, and the association between standardization and effective-
ness is not straightforward. The most robust finding of the study is that the early age of selection links 
closely with high inequality of opportunity. 
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1 Introduction 
To have a parent with a diploma guarantees that one will succeed in life. This may be an overly sim-
plistic summary of the social mobility research, but demonstrates the incredible importance of the fam-
ily, especially when it comes to educational attainment. Yet, studies comparing fairly large amount of 
countries show large differences in social mobility (Breen, 2005; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996b; Shavit & 
Blossfeld, 1993; Shavit & Müller, 1998), and also in the impact of the socio-economic status on educa-
tional literacy (OECD, 2001, 2004c). The most plausible explanation for these differences is that the 
possible channels through which parental background can affect the child are dissimilar across coun-
tries. This dissimilarity is due mainly to institutional differences. There are numerous studies that have 
looked at the association between educational institutions and the impact of family background on 
educational attainment (Ammermüller, 2005; Arnett, 2007; Dustmann, 2004; Erikson & Jonsson, 
1996b; Fertig & Kluve, 2005; Eric A. Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; Marks, 2006; Shavit & Blossfeld, 
1993; Söderström & Uusitalo, 2005; Wössmann, 2004, 2007), and most of the authors either provide a 
strong theoretical framework that describes the possible institutional mechanisms (e.g. Allmendinger, 
1989; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996b; Kerckhoff, 2000), or use sophisticated methodology and good data 
to empirically test the effect of some specific institutions (e.g. Amermüller, 2005; Eric A. Hanushek & 
Wössmann, 2005; Wössmann, 2004). However, the combination of these two aspects is atypical. Fill-
ing this niche with this paper, I try to combine the former, theoretically oriented framework adapted 
from the school-to-work literature, and the latter, empirically focused research of the economics of 
education. Specifically, I take the stratification/standardization dimensions of the school-to-work stud-
ies and systematically operationalize these dimensions to test the association between the educa-
tional institutions and the inequality of opportunity and the effectiveness of education, two crucial foci 
of the economics of education. The explicit goal of this study is to systematically go through the possi-
ble variables of stratification and standardization, and reveal those variables that are the most suitable 
for empirical purposes; that is to find which variables of stratification and standardization – under-
scored by the theory – associate significantly with the inequality of opportunity or with the effective-
ness of education. I use only internationally comparable datasets, such as the OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) 2003 study (OECD, 2004c)1 – that looks at the reading, 
mathematical and scientific literacy of the 15-year-olds – and other OECD indicators mainly from the 
Education at a Glance (EAG) series (OECD, 2004b, 2005a, 2007). 
The outline of the paper is the following: the second section clarifies what I mean by effectiveness, 
inequality of opportunity, stratification and standardization, and lists the hypotheses that are tested in 
the second half of the paper. The third part introduces the possible variables that can be used as prox-
ies for stratification and standardization, and the fourth elaborates on the methodology used for testing 
                                                     
1 Even if the new 2006 wave of PISA already was available at the publication of this paper, this was not true at 
the time of submission; moreover, other country level variables – gained mainly from the EAG series – usually 
refer to 2003, and more recent data are not yet available; which also underlines the use of the earlier wave. 
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the hypotheses. The next section goes over the results and expands on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from these, while the final part is a summary of the paper. 
2 Analytic framework 
The performance of the educational system will be understood throughout this paper as the average 
literacy scores of the students. Generally, school performance could be understood as some measure 
of school success, such as for instance, the average mathematical or reading literacy scores of the 
students, continuation rates from primary to secondary or from secondary to tertiary level, or the aver-
age time students run the 100m in athletics. This measure always depends on the focus of the paper, 
and the availability of data. In this paper I use the combined mathematical and reading literacy skills of 
15-year-olds, because I believe this is a suitable proxy of human capital and determines the future life-
success of the students, and because the utilized PISA data is the only available comprehensive data 
set that is suitable for proper cross-country comparative purposes. 
The effectiveness of the educational system is the performance controlled for exogenous effects, such 
as the socio-economic background of the students, their gender and age or their immigrant status. In 
other words, effectiveness is the “net” or adjusted performance, where all of the variables that could 
have an effect on the performance but are not under the control of the schools are controlled for. Natu-
rally, in practice only a few of the exogenous variables can be controlled for, due to the availability of 
data. 
The educational inequality of opportunity is understood as the effect of parental background on the 
performance measure, controlled for the exogenous effects; that is, I look at how much the parental 
background determines the students’ adjusted literacy scores. The higher the association between the 
parental background and the student literacy score the more unequal the system is. This understand-
ing of the inequality of opportunity is in accordance to that of the OECD (2004c) or to other authors’ as 
well (e.g. Amermüller, 2005; Wössmann, 2004). 
Two other important notions of this paper are the stratification and the standardization of the educa-
tional system. Stratification is the phenomena that children with similar ability, socio-economic charac-
teristics or interests are selected into separate groups/schools, and that there is no or little mobility be-
tween these. Stratification, in the scientific literature, is usually referred to as tracking, streaming, sort-
ing or grouping of children. Standardization can be understood as “the degree to which the quality of 
education meets the same standard nationwide” (Allmendinger, 1989, 233), or to put it differently, in a 
standardized system it does not matter where children go to school, they receive the same education. 
Although this framework was initially created for different analytical purposes, to theorize the strength 
of association between the educational attainment and the labor market outcomes (Allmendinger, 
1989; Kerckhoff, 2000; Shavit & Müller, 2000), I find it useful for analyzing educational inequalities as 
well. 
Arbei tspapiere – Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  107 
- 3 -  
2.1 Stratification 
The stratification dimension has been extensively employed in exploring educational inequalities. The 
most often used proxy for stratification is the early tracking of students into separate and ability/status 
homogeneous groups. The logic behind the inequality advancing effect of early tracking/selection is 
that the earlier children are separated according to ability or merit, the more their family background 
will have an impact on this ability, and thus the more homogeneous groups of children will go to the 
same schools (Dustmann, 2004). Lower status families will also consider this choice a “hurdle” rather 
than a real option and thus family status will have a greater impact on this choice (Erikson & Jonsson, 
1996a). Moreover, if similar status children are grouped together, positive peer-group effect will be 
lower in lower status schools; relying on the observation that children’s achievement depends not only 
on students’ own abilities, but also on the average ability of the class, this selection will help higher 
status students more (Betts & Shkolnik, 2000). In addition to all this, if early selection places children 
into different tracks that are valued differently by the labor market, the family background will also 
have a major impact on future wages of the child (Dustmann, 2004). Hence the more stratified a sys-
tem is, the more disadvantaged families will lose and thus the higher the inequality of opportunity is. 
The relationship between stratification and effectiveness is more complicated. The OECD (2004a) 
points out that performance and social equity goes strongly together: those countries that are less 
equal tend to perform better than the others. This observation, however, should not be interpreted as a 
causal relationship, one cannot be sure whether social equity induces higher school performance or 
vice-versa, or that there are some intervening variables that correlate both with social equity and per-
formance. The obvious candidates for the intervening variables are the selective institutions, such as 
the early age of selection. However, the micro mechanisms, through which this might hamper school 
performance, are contradictory. Opponents of early selection argue that positive peer group effect 
plays an important role in raising student performance: better students help the slower ones more than 
they lose from this interaction; i.e. grouping children lowers the average performance of slower pupils, 
while better ones gain only a little from it. Empirical research also finds no positive effects of grouping 
(Betts & Shkolnik, 2000). On the other side, selection at an early age is supported, mostly based on 
the argument that every student should receive personalized education; every child is different, thus 
unified education would hinder progress. Early vocational specialization, for instance, might be benefi-
cial for future employment chances for those who would surely not continue in academic education 
(Arum & Shavit, 1995). 
2.2 Standardization 
The use of the standardization dimension in research on educational inequalities so far has been less 
straightforward. This is probably due to the fact that standardization is a fuzzier notion than stratifica-
tion, which is also apparent in Allmendinger’s definition: “Variables such as teachers’ training, school 
budget, curricula, and the uniformity of school-leaving examinations are relevant in measuring the 
standing of an educational system on this [standardization] dimension” (1989, 233). 
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There are, nevertheless, studies that do look at aspects of the standardization dimension. Gamoran 
(1996), for example, has looked at Scottish educational reform between 1984 and 1990. He, among 
other things, concluded that “when national systems of curricula and examinations are aligned, cen-
trally directed reforms can be a mechanism both for raising standards, and for reducing inequality” 
(17). Gamoran also emphasized that this conclusion “may be overly simplistic,” since Scotland is a 
small and rather homogeneous country, but “the merits of standardized curricula linked to nationally 
recognized examinations should be seriously considered” (18). 
To overcome the troubles in understanding the notion of standardization, I propose two distinct and 
widely used sub-categories: the accountability and the centralization of the educational system. I de-
fine accountability as a system of standardized incentives for schools. When schools face similar in-
centives, their actions will most likely also be very similar, hence the more homogeneous an account-
ability system is, the higher the standardization of the education system. The most straightforward in-
stitutions of accountability are the school leaving exams, or other nationally recognized examinations. 
Only a couple of scholars, for instance Bishop and Mane (2004), test the effect of increased academic 
standards on the equality of opportunity. They find that in the US a strict mode of raising academic 
standards – namely the curriculum-based external exit exam – lowers the achievement gap between 
high and low status students; however other voluntary, non-standardized exit exams or the minimum 
number of compulsory courses are not effective. Most of the people researching accountability look at 
the association between this and the effectiveness of the system; a widely accepted idea is that the 
power to observe schoolwork is also a requirement for high productivity i.e. increased effectiveness. 
According to Hanushek and Raymond (2002), it is not the question whether accountability systems are 
necessary or not for increasing effectiveness (they are), but it is the type of system, and the incentives 
they create that needs to be studied more carefully. Several authors look at the state level account-
ability systems in the United States, but the empirical evidence – whether accountability raises student 
performance or not – are rather mixed (Carnoy, Loeb, & Smith, 2001; Dolton, 2002; Ladd, 2001; Mur-
nane & Levy, 2001). Centralization is equated throughout this paper with the strength of central regu-
lation on school processes. That is, I claim that the more the central or national government is in-
volved in regulating the inner lives of schools, the more standardized the system is. Kerckhoff also ar-
gues that “[c]entral control does not necessarily lead to standardization of the educational system, but 
there is a strong tendency for it to do so” (2000, 458). 
Politicians consider decentralization a panacea for all problems of the system. From the 1980s, a clear 
trend of decentralization of education can be observed in many developed countries. Green et al. 
(1999) – looking at EU countries – argue that there are several possible reasons for this. The most 
relevant for my paper is the pressure to improve cost-efficiency of education, and “governments have 
seen ‘decentralization’ as one way of achieving this with minimum political costs” (ibid., 54). That is, 
most politicians would consider decentralization a tool to increase the effectiveness of the system. An-
other anti-centralization measure is school autonomy. School autonomy means free decision making 
inside schools, to be able to construct the curriculum, to hire/fire teachers, to allocate resources freely 
and most importantly to select students based on any criteria. Selecting students based on merit or on 
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social class is shown to be detrimental to equality. If “schools and children are free to seek each other 
out: with some caveats, this leads to perfect segregation by child quality.” (Robertson & Symons, 
2003). 
Hence it seems that although there are only a few studies that consider the association between ac-
countability or (de)centralization and effectiveness or inequality, they suggest that both aspects of 
standardization (accountability and centralization) seem to increase the equality of opportunity, while 
accountability might increase and centralization might decrease effectiveness. 
3 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature the following hypotheses are derived. 
H1) Stratification increases the inequality of opportunity. The earlier children are selected into groups, 
or the more homogeneous these groups are, the higher the parental impact on this selection, thus 
the higher the inequality of opportunity. 
H2) There is no association between stratification and effectiveness. 
a) Arguments about peer-group effects being beneficial or detrimental to school effectiveness go 
both ways: it is still unclear whether more homogeneous groups, on average, would perform 
better or worse; whether better students would help slower students more than they lose by 
helping them. 
b) The effects of vocational training on general skill measures should be negative; however it 
should advance the practical skills of the pupils. 
H3) Standardization reduces the inequality of opportunity. 
a) The more centralized a system is, the less parental background matters. The logic is that the 
more centralized the education system, the less local interest groups can influence the cur-
riculum, budget, admission, personnel matters and more; hence the more similar the schools 
will be. If every school is similar (within the specific track, if tracking is present) then it would 
not matter where the child entered the school, considering that lower parental background can 
be associated with lower spatial mobility and thus a limited alternative set of schools, this 
leads to lower parental background effect on the outcome.2 
b) The more transparent the school-work or the more visible its output (e.g. exit exam, more pub-
lic information on student or school work) the smaller are the assumed informational advan-
tages of higher status families, thus the more equal the system is. 
H4) The association between standardization and effectiveness is ambiguous. Centralization (i.e. not 
decentralization) should dampen productivity, while accountability should enhance productivity. 
                                                     
2 Note that this argument does not hold, if perfect spatial status segregation is present.  
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a) Decentralization improves effectiveness, because it increases competition and competition is 
assumed to increase productivity, and because it increases local decision making so that 
schools can adapt more easily to the local demand (cf. EU’s subsidiarity principle). 
b) Accountability raises effectiveness because it provides incentives for schools to improve 
school-work and it decreases transaction costs of parents (higher transparency). 
H5) Stratification and standardization are two perpendicular dimensions. I assume that these two sets 
of institutions are separate because there are no reasons to assume the contrary. 
4 Variables 
When trying to create a quantified indicator of some widely defined notion – such as stratification or 
standardization – one always has to consider two important constraints: the data availability and the 
plausibility of the assumed connection between the proposed proxy and the theoretical notion. In this 
paper I deliberately use widely available data that can be applied to proxy stratification and standardi-
zation. This allows more transparency than the use of qualitatively created tracking indicators would, 
although I also realize its disadvantage of being more proximate than the “hand-adjusted” proxies. 
Moreover, while qualitative data generation allows the researcher to “fill in the gaps”, that is to impute 
missing values by hand, using remote indicators carries the problem of missing values. In this paper 
there are several indicators that are missing for some countries, and considering the small number of 
cases (29) this might introduce a serious problem to the statistical analysis. The reader must keep this 
in mind when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, despite the small number of cases, I find signifi-
cant and robust results that make generalization possible. 
4.1 Stratification 
As far as the stratification dimension is concerned there are some commonly used and widely avail-
able indicators (see Table 1 below). 
The age of first selection and the number of school types are available for almost any country, and 
both of them have a strong theoretical link to stratification; the earlier children are selected the higher 
the parental impact on this selection and the more children are grouped (i.e. the higher the number of 
tracks they are selected into) the more homogeneous these groups can be. It must be noted that the 
age of selection is also an obvious indicator for non-comprehensiveness. The comprehensive educa-
tional system is a non-selective, unified one, where children are mixed and taught the same curriculum 
for the possible longest time. The more comprehensive a system is, the later the age of selection. 
Note that a late age of selection does not necessarily imply a comprehensive system, only an early 
age of selection necessitates a non-comprehensive one. 
The ratio of vocationally trained students is a less direct, although very widely used, proxy for stratifi-
cation. The vocational specificity of the educational system crosscuts the standardizing and stratifying 
dimensions. Most countries that provide state funded vocational credentials, logically, also putting 
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children into separate groups, hence have a selective system. On the other hand, the existence of vo-
cational credentials offers a clear signal about the type of the training the pupils receive, which makes 
the product of education more comparable, and hence it can be considered as an aspect of standardi-
zation as well. 
A less popular but theoretically attractive indicator of stratification can be the percentage of schools 
that select children into their programs taking their former academic record or entrance exam results 
into account (academic selection). Assuming that academic merit correlates highly with social status, 
one might argue that an academically selective system is status selective as well (Robertson & Sy-
mons, 2003). Necessarily, the higher the number of academically selective schools, the higher the 
stratification of the system will be. 
Table 1 Indicators of stratification 
sign* Variable 
name 
Description Source 
- age of  
selection 
First age of selection in the education system, 
2003 
EAG 2005, D6.1 
+ number of 
school types  
Number of school types or distinct educational 
programs available for the 15-year-olds, 2003 
EAG 2005, D6.1 
+ ratio of voca-
tional training 
Percentage of upper secondary enrollment in pre-
vocational or vocational programs, 2003 
EAG 2005 C2.1 
+ academic  
selection 
Ratio of school heads that reported that the school 
considers previous academic record or the results 
of an entrance exam as a prerequisite for atten-
dance 
PISA 2003 School 
questionnaire: Ques-
tion 10 
*The signs show the suspected association between the indicators and the unobserved stratification dimension. 
See Table A1 in the appendix for descriptive data. 
4.2 Standardization 
I divide the indicators of standardization into the above mentioned two separate dimensions of cen-
tralization and accountability (see Table 2 below). 
4.2.1 Centralization 
I have found Indicators of centralization both in the PISA 2003 schools questionnaire and in the EAG 
2004. In the PISA questionnaire, school heads were asked about the state or national level influence 
in budgeting, curriculum, personnel matters or in other matters. I assume that the higher the number of 
school heads that reported these influences in all of these areas, the more centralized the system is 
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(direct government influence) and reversely, the more school heads reported that the national or state 
government have no say in their school, the lower the degree of centralization is (school autonomy). 
The EAG 2004 presented a different measure: local experts were asked, approximately what percent-
age of the decisions relating to the public lower secondary level education is taken at school, local, 
sub-regional, provincial/regional, state or central level. The higher percentage given for the central 
level, the more centralized the system is (central level decision making), while higher percentages at 
the school level mean low centralization (school level decision making). 
4.2.2 Accountability 
As suggested by Allmendinger (1989), unified school leaving examinations can also push towards a 
standardized education system. If everyone is to pass an exam (national exam), or if students are 
evaluated periodically (periodical assessment), the students themselves as well as outsiders can eas-
ily find out what is expected from the pupils. This – supposedly – decreases transaction costs or the 
informational advantage of the higher status families. If there is more information available on the stu-
dent or on the school performance, the parents can choose more easily, or at least the comparative 
advantage of higher status families is smaller because it is much easier to gain information on any 
school. An existing system of accountability can also be considered as a standardizing institution if it 
provides cheap and widely available information for everyone (accountability index). The existence of 
national requirements that schools be regularly inspected (regular inspection) or an existing national 
inspectorate are also indicators of a school system that considers accountability an important issue. 
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Table 2 Indicators of standardization 
Centralization 
sign* Variable name Description Source 
- school auton-
omy 
Ratio of school heads that did not report direct 
national or regional influence in any of these 
categories: staffing, budgeting, instructional con-
tent or assessment practices 
PISA 2003 School 
questionnaire:  
Q. 27 
+ direct govern-
ment influence:  
Ratio of school heads that reported direct na-
tional or regional influence in all of these: staff-
ing, budgeting, instructional content and as-
sessment practices, % of schools 
PISA 2003 School 
questionnaire:  
Q. 273 
- school level de-
cision making 
Percentage of decisions relating to public sector, 
lower secondary education, taken at school 
level, 2003  
EAG 2004 D6.14 
+ central decision 
making 
Percentage of decisions relating to public sector, 
lower secondary education, taken at central 
level, 2003 
EAG 2004 D6.1 
*The signs show the suspected association between the indicators and the unobserved stratification dimension. 
See Table A2 in the appendix for descriptive data. 
                                                     
3 Note that in the PISA questionnaire, the national and state levels cannot be distinguished. That is, in federal 
states, e.g. Germany or the USA, the state influence is also counted as centralization. This is why school 
autonomy should be a better proxy for standardization. 
4 Note that this measure is only available for 24 countries. See table A1. in the appendix. Data in the EAG 2004 
are from the OECD-INES survey 2003 on decision making in education. 
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Table 2 Indicators of standardization (continued) 
Accountability 
sign* Variable name Description Source 
+ national exam Existence of a national examination for students 
in public schools at lower secondary education, 
2005 
EAG 2007 D5.1 
+ periodical as-
sessment 
Existence of a periodical national assessment in 
compulsory education, lower secondary public 
school students, data for 2005 
EAG 2007 D5.1 
+ accountability 
index 
An average of the following five dummy vari-
ables: (1) info. to local community, (2) info. to 
parents, (3) information made available to par-
ents to inform school choice, plus (4) the use of 
school evaluation information by higher adminis-
trative levels to provide financial rewards or 
sanctions and (5) to motivate decisions on sup-
port for school improvement. Missing values are 
ignored, i.e. average of the available dummies 
EAG 2007 D5.2 
+ regular inspec-
tion 
Existence of a legal or formal administrative 
framework that lower secondary public schools 
to be inspected regularly, 2005 
EAG 2007 D5.1 
+ national inspec-
torate 
Existence of national/regional school inspector-
ate, 2005 
EAG 2007 D5.1 
*The signs show the suspected association between the indicators and the unobserved stratification dimension. 
See Table A2 in the appendix for descriptive data. 
5 Methods 
In order to test the association between the educational inequality of opportunity and educational 
stratification, I use the OECD PISA 2003 data (OECD, 2004c) and other OECD sources – such as the 
Education at a Glance (OECD, 2005a) – for the institutional proxies. I utilize a two-level hierarchical 
mixed model (see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Snijders & Bosker, 1999) to estimate the coefficients of 
the individual level socio-economic background variable on the literacy of the students. 
I have used the following model. The first (individual) level estimation is 
(1) Literacy=β0+β1*ESCS+Σβi*X+r i=2..n 
where β is the estimated individual level coefficient, n is the number of variables in the equation, r is 
the error term, ESCS stands for the economic, social and cultural background, the independent vari-
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able in focus, and X is a vector of individual control variables, such as grade, age, gender and immi-
grant status. The outcome (Literacy) is the mathematical and reading literacy plausible values in the 
PISA 2003 data. The dataset provides 5 plausible values for each literacy domain (5 for mathematics 
and 5 for reading in this case), with suggestions that the researchers use all of these for a more pre-
cise estimation. The equation should be estimated as many times as many plausible values are util-
ized, and the coefficients and standard errors should be estimated using the results of the separate 
regressions (for details on the estimation procedure see: OECD, 2005b). I have imputed the first level 
missing values firstly by using other available information from the dataset and secondly by substitut-
ing the country mean.5 Additional control dummies for the imputed values are included in the estima-
tion, but are not shown in the tables. 
The second (country) level estimations are 
(2) β0=δ00+ δ01*INST+u0 
(3) β1=δ10+ δ11*INST+u1 
where δ is the estimated coefficient, and u0 and u1 are the country level error terms. Its sub-indexes 
are defined as follows: the first index refers to the number of the variable on the individual level, and 
the second represents the number on the country level. INST is an institutional indicator, listed above. 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) I get: 
(4a) Literacy= δ00+ δ01*INST+u0+( δ10+ δ11*INST+u1)*ESCS+Σβi*X+r 
rearranging it, I get 
(4b) Literacy= δ00+δ10*ESCS+δ01*INST+δ11*INST*ESCS+Σβi*X+(r+u0+u1*ESCS) 
where the coefficients of interest are the δ10 that is the effect of the ESCS on the literacy scores, that 
proxies the inequality of educational opportunity and the δ11 which shows how the different institutions 
affect the strength of the association between the socio-economic status and the literacy scores. 
The estimated basic regressions are in Table 3 below, while the estimated institutional parameters are 
in the Tables 4 and 5 in the results section. I have standardized the literacy scores and the ESCS 
variables within countries, so that the unit movements are comparable (more on this see: Horn, 2007). 
The ESCS index was standardized within country to have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. 
The standard deviations of the ten plausible values were transformed to be 100 within country, while 
their initial means were kept so the levels of literacy (the effectiveness dimension) also remained 
comparable. 
                                                     
5 For instance to impute the missing values of the ESCS I used the predicted values from an OLS regression of 
ESCS on years of parental education, parental work status and home possessions. Where all of these were 
missing I used the country mean to impute missing ESCS values. 
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The used method can be criticized on the ground that there are only 29 country level observations and 
thus including too many country level variables might decrease the degrees of freedom too much. To 
avoid this, I have included only one institutional variable in each regression. Despite the small number 
of cases some of the results are indeed statistically significant. 
Table 3 Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of educational institutions and the 
educational inequality of opportunity – Basic models 
Mathematical and Reading 
Literacy, PISA 2003 Basic 
      
  Intercept 676,89*** 
  (56,58) 
Individual 
level vari-
ables Grade 47,05*** 
  (3,64) 
 Age -11,29*** 
  (3,51) 
 Female 7,73 
  (26,13) 
 
Second genera-
tion immigrant -9,95 
  (6,24) 
 
First generation 
immigrant -27,07*** 
  (7,21) 
 ESCS 35,11*** 
  (1,39) 
  U_intcpt 29,29 
 U_escs 8,16 
 R 81,65 
  Level 1 units: 219043; Level 2 units: 29 
Note: missing values are imputed and controlled for; robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01 
**p<0,05 *p<0,1. All of the variables in this basic regression are included in the extended regressions below 
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6 Results 
The results support the first hypothesis (H1), namely that stratification increases inequality of opportu-
nity. The age of selection and the number of school types show significant effects. Moreover, although 
neither the ratio of vocational training, nor the other indicators seem to associate significantly with the 
inequality of opportunity, all of the used proxies point in the expected direction. Since the number of 
observations is rather small, I believe that the results very robustly support the first hypothesis (see 
Table 4 below). 
The most important conclusion of this analysis is that the age of selection is the key indicator of strati-
fication. The age of selection associates very closely with the parental background effect, or in other 
words, the earlier countries select the higher their inequality of opportunity is. This result is also high-
lighted by the model in Table A3 (in the appendix), where four proxies of stratification (age of selec-
tion, number of school types, ratio of vocational training and the academic selection) were included 
simultaneously. The age of selection remains significant even when other stratification proxies are 
controlled for. Moreover, the age of selection seems to increase the adjusted literacy scores, which 
suggests that if other effects of stratification are controlled for, the later children are selected the 
higher their expected literacy scores will be. 
This significance of the age of selection in increasing inequality of opportunity is unsurprising but very 
important. Unsurprising on the one hand, since the theory of stratification, elaborated above, points 
out the importance of family background at an early age. The earlier children are selected, or the ear-
lier they have to make decisions about their future (which track to choose), the more the parents can 
impact this selection. On the other hand it is very important because it points out that non-
comprehensive systems are indeed very unequal. Age of selection – as I have mentioned above – is a 
fair indicator of non-comprehensiveness, the systems that select early are certainly not comprehen-
sive. The results show that non-comprehensive systems are not equal, but they do not show that all of 
the systems that select late are equal (see Figure 1 below). This is due to the fact that the late age of 
selection does not necessitate a comprehensive system. 
Additionally, I have to emphasize that PISA was taken at the age of 15. The most selective systems 
selected the students five years before this age, but almost half of the countries select only after the 
PISA measures the student literacy. This means that in these countries the children were still sitting in 
a mixed class, but it does not mean that they will not be separated soon. The differences between the 
countries might not be this obvious if I had looked at people at an older age, when all of the countries 
have already selected the students, and when other separate impacts could already have taken place 
and when one year differences in the age of selection might be negligible. This, however, does not 
mean that the age of selection is unimportant. On the contrary: as the OECD argues, age 15 is a vital 
stage in every person’s life (this is why they picked this); an unequal system at this stage can have a 
very long lasting, and decisive effect throughout the life course. 
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Figure 1 Age of selection and the inequality of opportunity 
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Table 4 Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of stratification proxies and the 
inequality of opportunity and the effectiveness 
Stratification 
Country level variables 
age of selec-
tion (r) 
number of 
school types 
ratio of vocational 
training 
academic se-
lection 
Main effect (δ01, effectiveness) 4,43 -3,57 0,35 0,24
 (3,46) (4,01) (0,39) (0,39)
Interaction effect (δ11, inequal-
ity of opportunity) -1,11** 1,20* 0,06 0,07
  (0,42) (0,67) (0,04) (0,06)
U_intcpt 36,26 37,17 36,43 36,95
U_escs 4,88 5,18 5,26 5,31
R 88,17 88,18 88,17 88,18
Level 1 units: 219043 219043 219043 219043
Level 2 units: 29 29 29 29
Note: Coefficients for individual level variables are not shown. The titles of the regressions are the variables in-
cluded as country level independent variables in the basic model. Missing values are imputed and controlled for; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,1. (r) - reverse (negative) hypothesized rela-
tionship 
Hypothesis two (H2) is weakly supported by the results (see Table 4 above). None of the utilized prox-
ies seems to affect the effectiveness of the system. Not only the effects are non-significant (which 
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might be an artifact of the small number of cases), but the signs of the estimated coefficients are also 
contradictory. While the age of selection and the number of school types suggest that stratification is 
bad for effectiveness, the ratio of vocational training and the academic selection indicators offer the 
opposite interpretation. 
Naturally, one might argue that the latter two also indicate other features of the system: large ratio of 
vocational training necessitates vocational specificity that children are selected according to their in-
terest and academic selection suggests meritocratic selection. These could have a positive effect on 
the literacy scores. Moreover the association between these two variables and the inequality of oppor-
tunity is very weak. Another reasonable argument would be that the age of selection and the number 
of school types are more plausible indicators of stratification, and thus stratification is bad for effec-
tiveness. However, since the estimated coefficients are non significant, I would only conclude that 
stratification is certainly not good for increasing effectiveness. 
Tables 5a and 5b offer the tests for the 3rd hypothesis (H3). In sum, the data does not reject that stan-
dardization reduces inequality of opportunity. Centralization seems to associate negatively with the 
inequality of opportunity (see Table 5a below). Two of the proxies used – school autonomy and school 
level decision making – are significantly and positively associated with the inequality of opportunity, 
and the other two centralization indicators also show the expected signs. However none of the ac-
countability indicators are significant (see Table 5b below), and the existence of a national inspector-
ate associates positively with the inequality of opportunity. 
The association of standardization and effectiveness is ambiguous, but not in line with the reasons 
outlined in the 4th hypothesis (H4), which claimed that centralization would decrease effectiveness, 
while higher accountability would increase effectiveness (these results are in Tables 5a and 5b). The 
empirical results are rather mixed. Central decision making is the only centralization indicator, which is 
significant, and it underlines that centralization hinders effectiveness, however the other three indica-
tors are not significant, and also direct government influence correlates positively with the adjusted 
performance measure, suggesting the opposite. Note, however, that this variable treats federal states 
as centralized (see footnote 3), which might bias its coefficients. Similarly, there are two significant re-
sults in Table 5b: the existence of a national exam shows a negative association with higher net per-
formance (which is against expectations), while the accountability index correlates positively with the 
effectiveness. This latter index captures very important aspects of accountability (information flow, 
evaluation, financial incentives and decision motivating by data), and hence I would argue that its ef-
fects both on the effectiveness and on the inequality dimension should be taken seriously. Based only 
on this I would claim that accountability raises effectiveness, but the other indicators do not seem to 
support this statement: the signs of the coefficients of the other three proxies are mixed. Thus I would 
conclude that I cannot reject the idea that decentralization – most likely through advanced competition 
– enhances effectiveness, however I cannot claim that higher accountability would correlate positively 
with effectiveness. 
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Table 5a Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of standardization proxies and the 
inequality of opportunity and effectiveness 
Standardization (Centralization) 
Country level variables 
school auton-
omy (r) 
direct govt. 
influence 
school level deci-
sion making (r) 
central decision 
making 
Main effect (δ01, effective-
ness) 37,88 30,93 0,55 -0,91**
 (53,37) (39,22) (0,36) (0,31)
Interaction effect (δ11, inequal-
ity of opportunity) 14,20* -5,91 0,10* -0,04
  (8,18) (6,61) (0,06) (0,05)
U_intcpt 37,48 37,19 38,33 34,72
U_escs 5,34 5,37 5,11 5,53
R 88,17 88,17 88,03 88,03
Level 1 units: 219043 219043 169689 169689
Level 2 units: 29 29 24 24
Note: Coefficients for individual level variables are not shown. The titles of the regressions are the variables in-
cluded as country level independent variables in the basic model. Missing values are imputed and controlled for; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,1. (r) - reverse hypothesized relationship 
Table 5b Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of standardization proxies and the 
inequality of opportunity and the effectiveness 
Standardization (accountability) 
Country level variables 
national 
exam 
periodical as-
sessment 
accountability 
index 
regular in-
spection 
national in-
spectorate 
Main effect (δ01, effective-
ness) -28,26* -11,46 38,52** -8,94 17,99
 (14,31) (14,21) (16,69) (13,16) (15,90)
Interaction effect (δ11, 
inequality of opportunity) -1,44 -0,05 -3,23 -1,25 2,45
  (2,07) (1,99) (3,18) (2,21) (2,17)
U_intcpt 35,84 38,33 34,72 38,57 37,73
U_escs 5,23 5,29 5,24 5,25 5,14
R 88,04 88,04 87,95 88,04 88,04
Level 1 units: 180098 180098 181434 180098 180098
Level 2 units: 26 26 26 26 26
Note: Coefficients for individual level variables are not shown. The titles of the regressions are the variables in-
cluded as country level independent variables in the basic model. Missing values are imputed and controlled for; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,1. (r) - reverse hypothesized relationship 
There are only a few degrees of freedom to test institutional effects due to the small number of cases; 
hence I have only included one institutional proxy in each model. The question is, therefore, whether 
the two dimensions of standardization and stratification are independent or not, or the coefficients of 
the proxies present the same mechanisms (H5). Figure 2 below shows the age of selection plotted 
against the accountability index and the central decision making proxies of standardization. Also, Ta-
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ble A4 in the appendix shows the pair-wise correlations of the stratification and the standardization 
proxies. It is clear from these results that these stratification and standardization indexes are inde-
pendent. There are many stratified countries that are standardized, and conversely many standardized 
that are non-stratified, and none of the proxies show a systematic positive of negative relationship with 
the proxies from the other dimension. Similarly, if the most important proxies of stratification (age of 
selection) and some proxies of standardization (central decision making or accountability index) are 
simultaneously included in a model, the coefficients are little changed (see Table A5 in the appendix). 
Thus the two dimensions are not only independent but they have an independent effect on the ine-
quality of opportunity and on the effectiveness of the education system as well. 
Figure 2 Scatter-plots of age of selection and two proxies of standardization 
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7 Summary and concluding comments 
In this paper I combined the theoretically developed construction of the school to work transition litera-
ture, namely the stratification and standardization dimensions of the education system, and the more 
data oriented inequality of opportunity research of the economics of education. I collected several 
possible indicators for both dimensions and systematically tested their effects on the inequality of op-
portunity and effectiveness of education. Despite the small number of countries, that puts a limit on 
most of the cross-country comparative studies, the results here are statistically significant. Based on 
the theoretical literature, I listed five hypotheses, most of which were supported by the analysis. Strati-
fication associates strongly and positively with the inequality of educational opportunity, while stan-
dardization in general seems to enhance equality. The conducted multilevel analysis could not show 
clear associations between effectiveness and the stratification proxies, but we can reject that stratifica-
tion would be beneficial for higher literacy scores. The association of standardization and effective-
ness is more complex: one aspect of the assumed standardization dimension – centralization – asso-
ciates negatively with the effectiveness according to most of the proxies, while the other dimension–
accountability – has mixed effects, although the most reliable proxy of accountability shows a positive 
impact on effectiveness. Tests on the two main dimensions of stratification and standardization sup-
port their independence. 
The detailed results bring some very important and so far unanswered questions to light. The early 
age of selection seems not only to be detrimental to the inequality of opportunity, but it also correlates 
slightly with low effectiveness. So Why do countries select early? So far the stratified systems were 
defended based on the idea that selection and especially selection into vocationally specified training 
tracks can improve the pupils’ future employment chances (Arum & Shavit, 1995). However, there has 
been no argument towards the usefulness of early selection per se. This finding seems even more 
puzzling if we recognize that some of the Central Eastern European countries (such as Hungary, Slo-
vakia or the Czech Republic) introduced early selection after the transition, while others retained or 
even delayed the inherited soviet tradition of selection at age 14. I believe that this question can only 
be answered by historical or path dependency arguments, but this might be a topic of a different pa-
per. 
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8 Appendix 
Table A1 Stratification proxies – country values 
Country 
age of 
selec-
tion 
number 
of 
school 
types 
ratio of 
voca-
tional 
training
aca-
demic 
selec-
tion 
catch-
ment 
area 
Track-
ing 1 
Track-
ing 2 
strat. 
Index. 
OECD 
strat. 
Index. 2
AUS 16 1 64,20 1,88 16,14 0 0 -0,64 -0,78
AUT 10 4 79,20 42,63 22,40 1 1 1,21 1,44
BEL 12 4 70,30 14,71 0,73 1 1 0,94 1,00
CAN 16 1 0,00 4,00 36,78 0 0 -0,24 -1,10
CHE 15 4 65,00 29,14 63,02 1 0 0,16 0,18
CZE 11 5 79,50 44,44 4,69 1 1 0,73 1,66
DEU 10 4 62,20 12,63 30,20 1 1 1,15 1,15
DNK 16 1 53,60 1,04 31,25 0 0 -0,89 -0,90
ESP 16 1 37,20 1,37 32,61 0 0 -0,43 -0,96
FIN 16 1 58,80 0,51 35,03 0 0 -0,90 -0,91
GBR 16 1 69,20 12,83 20,70 0 0 -0,80 -0,71
GRC 15 2 36,00 0,60 57,65 1 0 -0,15 -0,65
HUN 11 3 49,80 35,47 19,49 1 1 0,50 0,85
IRL 15 4 28,30 0,76 12,78 1 0 0,25 0,15
ISL 16 1 35,10 0,00 47,90 0 0 -0,92 -1,07
ITA 14 3 63,80 1,50 3,23 1 0 -0,03 0,23
JPN 15 2 25,50 65,73 23,24 1 0 -0,22 -0,07
KOR 14 3 30,70 39,01 22,22 1 0 0,11 0,25
LUX 13 4 64,70 37,93 3,45 1 1 0,74 0,93
MEX 12 3 10,90 16,15 5,06 1 1 0,46 0,49
NLD 12 4 69,10 37,41 2,03 1 1 1,60 1,13
NOR 16 1 59,20 0,00 46,20 0 0 -0,88 -0,97
NZL 16 1 0,00 1,84 22,16 0 0 -0,85 -1,03
POL 15 3 54,30 7,83 54,22 1 0 -0,27 -0,23
PRT 15 3 28,50 1,32 22,22 1 0 0,14 -0,18
SVK 11 5 75,40 36,94 7,17 1 1 0,49 1,59
SWE 16 1 52,90 6,63 31,32 0 0 -0,89 -0,87
TUR 11 3 38,00 10,32 18,99 0 1 0,76 0,65
USA 16 1 0,00 6,61 64,47 0 0 -0,76 -1,24
 
Arbei tspapiere – Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  107 
- 20 -  
Table A2 Standardization proxies – centralization – country values 
Country 
school 
auton-
omy 
direct 
govern-
ment 
influ-
ence 
school 
level 
deci-
sion 
making
central 
deci-
sion 
making
national 
exams 
peri-
odical 
assess-
ment 
ac-
counta
b. index 
regular 
inspec-
tion 
national 
inspec-
torate 
AUS 0,03 0,43 24 0 0 1 0,80 1 1
AUT 0,02 0,28 29 27 0 0  0 1
BEL 0,03 0,21 43 0 0 1 1,00 1 1
CAN 0,01 0,43        
CHE 0,04 0,24   0 0 0,00 1 1
CZE 0,06 0,15 60 7 0 0 0,60 1 1
DEU 0,00 0,19 32 4 1 1 0,60 1 1
DNK 0,10 0,18 44 19 1 1 0,80 0 0
ESP 0,02 0,28 28 0 0 0 0,60 1 1
FIN 0,02 0,48 27 2 0 1  0 0
GBR 0,06 0,39 85 11 0 1 0,80 1 1
GRC 0,01 0,51 13 80 1 0 0,20 1 1
HUN 0,08 0,10 68 4 0 1 0,00 0 0
IRL 0,02 0,48   1 0 0,20 1 1
ISL 0,00 0,07 25 25 1 1 0,75 1 0
ITA 0,03 0,10 46 23 0 1 0,40 0 0
JPN 0,13 0,29 23 13 0 0 0,00 0 0
KOR 0,20 0,05 48 9 1 1 0,50 1 1
LUX 0,00 0,38 34 66 1 1 0,75 1 0
MEX 0,05 0,19 22 30 1 1 0,40 1 0
NLD 0,03 0,21 100 0 1 0 0,60 1 1
NOR 0,05 0,06 37 32 1 1 0,75 0 0
NZL 0,01 0,51 75 25 1 0 0,80 1 1
POL 0,33 0,02     0,00   
PRT 0,01 0,44 41 50 1 1 0,60 1 1
SVK 0,02 0,08 50 33   0,00   
SWE 0,26 0,04 47 18 1 1 0,80 1 1
TUR 0,01 0,20 24 49 1 1 0,25 1 1
USA 0,06 0,42   0 1 1,00 0 0
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Table A3 Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of stratifying educational institu-
tions and the educational inequality of opportunity 
Mathematical and Reading Literacy, PISA 2003 
Country level vari-
ables     
Effects on the inter-
cept age of selection 9,85* 
  (5,07) 
 
number of school 
types -1,37 
  (4,14) 
 
ratio of vocational 
training  0,601 
  (0,39) 
 academic selection 0,717 
  (0,48) 
Effects on the ESCS age of selection -1,34* 
  (0,71) 
 
number of school 
types -0,68 
  (1,40) 
 
ratio of vocational 
training  0,026 
  (0,05) 
 academic selection 0,0004 
    (0,05) 
  U_intcpt 33,00 
 U_escs 5,12 
 R 88,17 
Level 1 units: 219043; Level 2 units: 29 
Note: Coefficients for individual level variables are not shown. The titles of the regressions are the variables in-
cluded as country level independent variables in the basic model. Missing values are imputed and controlled for; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,1. (r) - reverse hypothesized relationship 
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Table A4 Pairwise correlations of the stratification and standardization proxies 
 age of selection number of school types ratio of vocational training academic selection
school autonomy (r) 0,19 -0,10 0,01 0,14 
  (0,33) (0,59) (0,96) (0,47) 
direct govt. Influence 0,34 -0,26 -0,37 -0,25 
  (0,08) (0,18) (0,05) (0,19) 
school level decision making (r)  -0,09 0,15 0,21 0,20 
  (0,69) (0,47) (0,32) (0,34) 
central decision making 0,01 0,09 -0,24 -0,13 
  (0,97) (0,68) (0,26) (0,55) 
national exam 0,02 0,00 -0,32 -0,26 
  (0,94) (1,00) (0,11) (0,20) 
periodical assessment 0,05 -0,27 0,02 -0,34 
  (0,80) (0,18) (0,91) (0,09) 
accountability index 0,29 -0,44 -0,03 -0,39 
  (0,15) (0,03) (0,87) (0,05) 
regular inspection -0,07 0,25 -0,04 -0,11 
  (0,75) (0,22) (0,84) (0,60) 
national inspectorate -0,17 0,30 0,18 -0,01 
  (0,40) (0,14) (0,37) (0,96) 
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Table A5 Hierarchical linear regressions. The association of stratifying and standardizing 
educational institutions and the educational inequality of opportunity 
Mathematical and Reading Literacy, PISA 2003 
Country level variables       
Effects on the intercept age of selection 3,27 4,03 
  (3,71) (3,27) 
 accountability index 32,76*  
  (17,55)  
 central decision making -0,81** 
  (0,37) 
Effects on the ESCS age of selection -0,87* -1,16** 
  (0,43) (0,44) 
 accountability index -1,61  
  (2,70)  
 central decision making -0,05 
  (0,04) 
  U_intcpt 34,77 33,85 
 U_escs 5,05 4,84 
 R 87,95 88,03 
 Level 1 units: 181434 169689 
  Level 2 units: 26 24 
Note: Coefficients for individual level variables are not shown. The titles of the regressions are the variables in-
cluded as country level independent variables in the basic model. Missing values are imputed and controlled for; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,1. (r) - reverse hypothesized relationship
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